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COMMENTS

VIRGINIA'S BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY
COMPENSATION ACT: CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY
CHALLENGES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1987, Virginia's General Assembly enacted the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (the Act).1 Although there is
a dearth of official legislative history for the Act, newspaper reports provide some insight as to the intended purpose and scope. Reportedly, the
Act was a response to medical malpractice insurers' refusal to provide
coverage for obstetricians. 2 Proponents of the Act feared critical shortages
of obstetrical services if action was not taken to ensure the availability of
liability insurance.3
The Act apparently was precipitated, at least in part, by Boyd v. Bu1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Supp. 1987).
2. The Philadelphia Hospital Insurance Company announced that beginning November
1, 1986, it would not renew coverage for physicians not employed by a hospital or practicing
with a group of 10 or more physicians. The Virginia Insurance Reciprocal and St. Paul's Fire
and Marine Insurance Company previously had announced moratoriums on new obstetrical
policies. THE LIABILIrY INSURANCE CRISIS AND THE NFED FOR TORT REFORM, REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA,

S. Doc. No. 11, 1987 Sess. 12-13 (1987)

[hereinafter THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS].

The Virginia Insurance Reciprocal agreed to lift its moratorium on writing malpractice
policies for obstetricians and lower premiums on currently effective policies if the possibility
of lawsuits for birth-related neurological injuries was eliminated. Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1987,
at B5, col. 5. The Virginia Insurance Reciprocal is a state-based physicians' group which
insures about one third of Virginia's doctors. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Nov. 16, 1987, at
A2, col. 4.
3. Delegate Clifton A. Woodrum, the Act's chief sponsor, reported that the Act was
designed to alleviate "'a crisis in health care' resulting from huge malpractice awards that
made it difficult for obstetricians to get insurance." Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1987, at B5, col. 4.
According to a survey conducted by the Medical Society of Virginia and the Virginia Hospital Association, 40% of Virginia's 600 obstetricians planned to stop delivering babies unless a solution was found. Id.
According to Delegate Woodrum, insurance companies lifted the ban on writing malpractice policies 10 days after passage of the Act. Wash. Post, Dec. 31, 1987, at B3, col. 3.
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lala.4 In Boyd, a federal district court held that Virginia's cap on medical
malpractice damages,5 violated the plaintiffs' constitutionally guaranteed
right to a jury trial.6 Mr. and Mrs. Boyd filed an action against Dr. Bulala
alleging that they and their daughter were injured as a result of the physician's negligent delivery of the infant. As a result of the perinatal injury,
the minor-plaintiff, Veronica Lynn Boyd, sustained profound physical
and mental handicaps.7 The jury awards against the defendant totaled
$8,300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.' Dr. Bulala's post-trial
motion to reduce the damage award in accordance with section 8.01581.15 of the Code of Virginia was denied on the basis that the statute
was unconstitutional.9
4. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986).
Boyd is the only "huge malpractice award" in Virginia which could support Delegate
Woodrum's claims. See supra note 3. Virginia's statutory cap on medical malpractice verdicts has been in effect since 1977. See infra note 5. The average medical malpractice claim
paid in Virginia in 1984 was $17,000. In the Richmond area, the average medical malpractice
award during 1982-1985 was $302,000. See THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS, supra note 2, at
8. See generally Debate on MalpracticeAward Cap is Revived, Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Nov. 16, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1984). In 1983, the statute was amended to
allow recovery up to $1,000,000. Id. A bill to reduce the ceiling to $500,000 in 1987 was not
enacted. H.B. 130, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1987 Sess. The provision in effect at the time of the
Boyd trial provided for a $750,000 limit on recovery against health care providers:
In any verdict returned against a health care provider in an action for malpractice
where the act or acts of malpractice occurred on or after April one, nineteen hundred
and seventy-seven, which is tried by a jury or in any judgment entered against a
health care provider in such an action which is tried without a jury, the total amount
recoverable for any injury to, or death of, a patient shall not exceed $750,000.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
Ambiguity as to whether the cap applied to each plaintiff or to the action as a whole was
not resolved in Boyd since the court held that the statute was unconstitutional. Boyd, 647 F.
Supp. at 790 n.8.
6. The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 788 (citing New York
Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S.
211 (1916); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876)).
The Boyd court found that the right to jury trial guaranteed by article I, section 11 of the
Virginia Constitution is equivalent to the federal seventh amendment right. Boyd, 647 F.
Supp. at 789.
Interpretations of both the federal and Virginia constitutional rights to jury trial establish
that damage awards, as well as liability determinations, are properly within the province of
the jury. See id. at 788-89 (citing Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935); Danville
Community Hosp. v. Thompson, 186 Va. 746, 43 S.E.2d 882 (1947); E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Taylor, 124 Va. 750, 98 S.E.2d 866 (1919).
For a searching analysis of Boyd, see Comment, The ConstitutionalAttack on Virginia's
Medical Malpractice Cap: Equal Protection and the Right to Jury Trial, 22 U. RICH. L.
REV. 95 (1987).
7. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 784. The child's disabilities included cerebral palsy,
quadriplegia, blindness, and mental retardation. Id. at 792-93.
8. The award included a total of $2,000,000 in punitive damages for injuries to the infant
and her mother. Id. at 784.
9. See supra note 6.
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In the wake of the Boyd decision, the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act 10 was passed. In accordance with malpractice insurance carriers' specifications, 1 the drafters, in an attempt to ensure that Boyd would not be repeated, completely removed similarly
injured infants from the tort system. The wisdom of this Act is questionable. The elimination of fault-based liability is antithetical to the deterrent
goal of the traditional tort system. 2 The Act, if upheld, could result in
increased birth-related injuries. This Comment will discuss bases for constitutional and policy challenges to the Act.
II.

PROVISIONS AND SCOPE OF THE ACT

The Act defines a class of severely injured children 3 and abolishes the
traditional common law rights and remedies of the children, their personal representatives, parents, dependents or next of kirk "arising out of
or related
to a medical malpractice claim with respect to such an
'' 4

injury. M

Effective January 1, 1988, the Act prescribes the exclusive remedy for
catastrophic brain and spinal cord injuries' 5 caused by the malpractice 6
10. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Supp. 1987).
11. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 122-133 and accompanying text.
13. It is estimated that approximately forty children per year will suffer birth-related
neurological injuries as defined in the Act. Wash. Post, Dec. 31, 1987, at B3, col. 3.
In an earlier report, the Act's chief sponsor, Delegate Clifton A. Woodrum, reported that
40 to 50 of the 65,000 babies born in Virginia each year would be affected. Id. Feb. 17, 1987,
at B3, col. 5. An opponent of the Act, Delegate Bernard S. Cohen, estimated that only two
or three such cases per year result from malpractice. Id. at B5,col. 6.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5002(B) (Supp. 1987).
Arguably, this provision precludes actions by relatives in their own rights for injuries related to malpractice during the delivery of the child. Therefore, damages such as those
awarded to the parents in Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986) would be disallowed. In addition to compensatory awards for past and future medical costs for their child,
the parents in Boyd received substantial damage awards for their own injuries related to the
birth. Mrs. Boyd received $2,575,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 784. Mr.
Boyd was awarded $1,175,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress. Id. at 792.
15. The birth-related neurological injuries covered under the Act are brain or spinal cord
injuries, caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury during delivery, which render
the child "permanently nonambulatory, aphasic, incontinent, and in need of assistance in all
phases of daily living." VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001.
16. The Act does not foreclose civil actions "against a physician or hospital where there
is clear and convincing evidence that such physician or hospital intentionally or willfully
caused or intended to cause a birth-related neurological injury." VA. CODE ANN. § 38.25002(C) (emphasis added). This section requires claimants to show specific malicious intent.
However, an action based on gross negligence or reckless disregard would have to be brought
under the Act's provisions.
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of "participating"17 physicians or hospitals. The Act does not provide
compensation for similar disabilities caused by genetic or congenital conditions."' However, to the extent that such injuries occur when adequate
medical care is provided during labor and delivery, the Act provides compensation without regard to fault.1"
All claims within the scope of the Act must be filed with the Industrial
Commission of Virginia, which has exclusive authority to make compensatory awards for such injuries.20 The Industrial Commission neither determines nor considers fault in assessing damages.2 ' The authority to review the quality of medical care rendered by participating physicians or
hospitals is exclusively delegated to the Board of Medicine or Depart2
ment of Health, respectively. 2
In contrast to the monetary limitation on total damages which was held
unconstitutional in Boyd v. Bulala,"3 the Act limits the types of damages
which may be recovered. Claimants may recover "medically necessary and
reasonable expenses of medical and hospital, rehabilitative, residential
and custodial care and service, special equipment or facilities, and related
travel."' 4 The Act requires that expenses be actually incurred before payment to avoid potential "windfalls" resulting from damage awards based
on inaccurate estimates of future medical expenses or future loss of
earnings. 5
17. "Participating" physicians and hospitals include licensed Virginia health care providers who have: (1) agreed to provide obstetrical care to indigent patients; (2) agreed to
submit to review by the State Board of Medicine or State Department of Health; and (3)
paid assessments prescribed by administrators of the Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Fund created by the Act. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001.
18. Id. § 38.2-5014.
19. Id. § 38.2-5008.
20. Id. § 38.2-5004.
21. Id. § 38.2-5008.
A panel of "three qualified and impartial physicians" will review each claim and submit to
the Industrial Commission a report "as to whether the injury alleged is a birth-related neurological injury within the meaning" of the Act. "The Commission must consider, but shall
not be bound by, the recommendations of the panel." Id. § 38.2-5008(B).
If the Commission determines that the injury is covered by the Act, an award is made in
accordance with § 38.2-5009 of the Code of Virginia.
Reconsideration of the Commission's determination of coverage or the amount of an
award may be obtained by timely application for rehearing by the full Commission. Id. §
38.2-5010. Appeals lie from the full Commission to the Court of Appeals. Id. § 38.2-5011.
22. Id. § 38.2-5004(B), (C). If the Board of Medicine or Department of Health "determines that there is reason to believe that the alleged injury resulted from, or was aggravated
by, substandard care" the agency "shall take any appropriate action" in accordance with
authority to impose sanctions granted under separate statutes. Id.
23. 647 F. Supp. 781; see also supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(1).
25. State provisions requiring periodic payment of medical malpractice awards and cessation of payment upon death of the patient have been upheld. See Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985); State ex rel Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81
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In addition to compensation for medical expenses actually incurred by
the claimants, the Act provides limited compensation for loss of earnings
after the child reaches eighteen years of age,26 and reasonable expenses
incurred in filing the claim, "including 'reasonable attorneys' fees."2 7 Notably absent from the Act is any provision
for noneconomic losses suf28
fered as a result of birth-related injuries.
In summary, the Act abolishes the common-law cause of action for
birth-related neurological injuries resulting from medical malpractice. In
place of common-law tort remedies, the Act creates a no-fault economic
compensation scheme. The Industrial Commission of Virginia is vested
with exclusive authority to make limited compensatory awards based on
actually incurred economic losses.
Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). But see Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, -, 424 A.2d
825, 838 (1980) ("Although there may be a windfall to the claimant's family if the periodic
payments are not terminated at the claimant's death, there is also a windfall benefit to the
defendant's insurer ...
if the claimant dies.").
Legislation abrogating or modifying the collateral source rule has been upheld in several
states. See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 403 So.2d 365 (Fla.
1981).
In Boyd, the infant plaintiff died six weeks after the trial. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 784. The
jury had awarded $2,850,000 in compensatory and punitive damages to the child. In addition, the parents were jointly awarded $1,700,000 for past and future medical expenses until
the child reached 18 years of age. Id. However, the court denied the defendant's motions to
reopen the record to present evidence of death and have the court set aside these verdicts
which arguably were based on incorrect estimates of the child's life expectancy. See id. at
796.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(3).
27. Id. § 38.2-5009(4).
28. In [workmen's] compensation, unlike tort, the only injuries compensated for are
those which produce disability and thereby presumably affect earning power ....
For example, while common-law verdicts of great size are common for facial disfigurement, it is usually held that, in the absence of an express provision making disfigurement compensable, no allowance can be made for it .... There is no place in compensation law for damages on account of pain and suffering, however dreadful they
may be.
1 A. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2.40 (1985).
Virginia's Act is unique in that it denies a class of medical malpractice victims any recovery for noneconomic losses. Less stringent legislative provisions limiting awards to medical
malpractice victims for noneconomic losses have been reviewed by several courts. Compare
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (upholding $250,000 cap on noneconomic losses), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985) with
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) ($250,000 cap on noneconomic damages unconstitutional); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355
N.E.2d 903 (Ct. C.P. 1976) (dicta indicating $200,000 limit on "general damages" unconstitutional) and Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) ($50Q,000 limit
on damages, excluding medical expenses, unconstitutional), writ of error revoked, 714
S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1986).
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT

Analogy to Constitutionally Valid Workers' Compensation Laws

Virginia is not alone in enacting legislation to respond to a real or perceived medical malpractice crisis. The Act incorporates limitations on
malpractice liability which have been attempted elsewhere. For instance,
statutory limitations on recovery,29 abrogation of the collateral source
rule,"0 and limits on attorneys' fees 31 have been enacted and reviewed in
other states.
However, Virginia's Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Act32 is unique in that it defines a small class of severely injured children3 3 and completely removes them from the tort system.34 The Act apparently was modeled after workers' compensation statutes. 35 The constitutionality of workers' compensation laws has been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court." Thus, proponents of the Act may assert that it is
constitutionally valid. However, the Act is distinguishable from workers'
compensation laws in significant respects.
29. See cases cited supra notes 25 & 28; see also Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273
Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (upholding $500,000 limit on total recovery); Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) (plurality opinion) (upholding $500,000 limit on
total recovery); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978)
(upholding $500,000 limit on recovery if compensation funds fall below specified levels). But
see Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977), modified on remand, Nos. 55527 and 55586 (4th Dist. Idaho, Nov. 3, 1980) (on
remand, $300,000 limit on damages unconstitutional); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp.
Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) ($500,000 limit on damages unconstitutional);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) ($300,000 limit on damages
unconstitutional).
30. See cases cited supra note 25.
31. At least twenty states have enacted legislation restricting contingent fee agreements.
See Essen & Aldred, The American Medical Association v. The American Tort System, 8
CAMPBELL L. REv. 241, 255 (1986).
Limits on plaintiffs' attorneys' fees were held unconstitutional in Carson v. Maurer, 120
N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980). But see Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d
164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (limitation of attorneys' fees upheld), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 990
(1985); Johnson, 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (limitation of attorneys' fees constitutional; direct relationship between statute's limitation on total recovery and limitation on
fees to plaintiffs' attorneys); Prendergast,199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (legislative provision
for judicial review of attorneys' fee arrangements valid).
32. Dicta in Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986), may have provided inspiration for the Act. In Boyd, the court held that Virginia's limitation on malpractice damages
was an unconstitutional infringement on the right to jury trial in civil actions. Id. at 788-89.
However, the court also noted that "the legislature may abolish the common-law right of

action and, if it desires, replace it with a compensation scheme." Id. at 789. Perhaps the Act
was drafted in reliance on this dicta.
33. See supra notes 13 & 15 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 2 & 14 and accompanying text.
35. See Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1987, at B5, col. 6.
36. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243
U.S. 210 (1917); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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"The necessity for workmen's compensation arose out of the coincidence of a sharp increase in industrial accidents attending the rise of the
factory system and a simultaneous decrease in the employee's commonlaw remedies for his injuries."" By contrast, the Act and other tort reform legislation have been enacted in response to dramatic increases in
insurance premium costs.3 s Thus, contrary to the impetus behind workers' compensation laws, tort reform s9 is an effort to protect
the alleged
40
tortfeasor and his insurer rather than the injured party.
Workers' compensation statutes provide limited compensation to employees for all employment-related injuries, regardless of fault. By contrast, the scope of the Act is more limited-it provides limited compensation to a small class of infant patients for catastrophic birth-related
injuries, regardless of fault.
Under the common law, employers could assert a number of faultbased defenses which would preclude employee recovery: for example,
contributory negligence, fellow servant's negligence, and assumption of
risk.41 Under the Act, there is no probability that a fault-based defense
could be asserted to preclude common-law recovery for the covered injuries. 42 Arguably, the nature and severity of injuries defined in the Act
37. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 28, at § 4.00.
38. In 1974-1975, medical malpractice insurance premiums increased at rates of up to
500% in some states. P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 97 (1985). Although the crisis subsided in the late 1970's, premium costs began rising again in the mid-1980's. Id. Malpractice
premium costs in 1984 were approximately three billion dollars. Id. at 18.
Notwithstanding the premium increases, a 1981 study indicated that physician earnings
were sufficiently high to offset premium costs. On the average, malpractice insurance coverage represented only 3.6% of physicians' yearly gross income. Id. at 187-88; see also The
Doctor-Lawyer War, NEW REPUBLIC, June 24, 1985, at 4 (the 2.9% of gross income the average physician spends on medical malpractice premiums is slightly higher than the 2.3%
spent on professional car maintenance).
39. Proponents of tort reform generally argue that the system encourages frivolous suits
and excessive jury awards which result in increased premium costs. See The Doctor-Lawyer
War, supra note 38, at 4; Lacayo, The Malpractice Blues, TIME, Feb. 24, 1986, at 60.
40. Legislative impediments to medical malpractice litigation have coincided with judicial acceptance of substantive legal theories which tend to expand health care providers'
liability. "With respect to medical malpractice litigation, the courts giveth and the state
legislatures taketh away." B. WERTHMAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW: How MEDICINE IS
CHANGING THE LAW 127 (1984).
41. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917).
42. The Act is applicable only to birth-related injuries sustained during the course of
labor and delivery, or during resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period. Therefore,
the infants covered by the Act are incapable of contributory negligence or assumption of
risk. The only bar to liability under a common-law malpractice theory for such injuries
would be the plaintiff's failure to prove that the physician or hospital rendered substandard
care. The Act obviates the plaintiff's burden of proving fault under the common law in these
circumstances. However, since there is no probability of contributory negligence or assump-

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:431

support a conclusion that such injuries rarely would occur in the absence
of malpractice.43
B. Due Process Analysis
1. Quid Pro Quo Considerations
The Act abrogates common-law tort actions for birth-related injuries,
arising out of or related to alleged malpractice, which render a child "permanently nonambulatory, aphasic, incontinent, and in need of assistance
in all phases of daily living.""' In place of the common-law cause of action, the Act substitutes a no-fault compensation scheme which basically
reimburses claimants for necessary and reasonable expenses actually
45
incurred.
Although the Act is unique in its total abrogation of the common-law
action for medical malpractice, several courts in other states have considered due process challenges to legislative modifications of the commonlaw cause of action. 4" The United States Supreme Court has pronounced
that common-law rights may be legislatively altered: "No person has a
vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall re7
main unchanged for his benefit.'
tion of risk, the defendant does not forfeit the opportunity to prevail by proving any affirmative, fault-based defenses.
43. "Birth-related neurological injury" means injury to the brain or spinal cord of an
infant caused by deprivation of oxygen or mechanical injury occurring in the course
of labor, delivery or resuscitation . . . in a hospital which renders the infant permanently nonambulatory, aphasic, incontinent, and in need of assistance in all phases
of daily living.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
Congenital and hereditary defects are specifically excluded from coverage under the Act.
Id. § 38.2-5014.
Some commentators have proposed a limited no-fault plan which would provide compensation for "designated compensable events" (DCEs) without regard to fault. The DCEs
would be outcomes which are most frequently associated with negligent treatment. See P.
DANZON, supra note 38, at 217. Arguably, the birth-related injuries defined in the Act are
"more often than not associated with negligent treatment." Id.
Danzon discusses a number of disadvantages inherent in the DCE proposal. DCEs would
not significantly lessen current litigation costs since, by definition, the injuries presumably
involve clear-cut liability. However, increased litigation could result over the issue of
whether an injury is a covered DCE. Present distortions in medical care resulting from defensive medicine and inadequate deterrence under the negligence system might increase
under the partial no-fault system. Id. at 217-18.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Supp. 1987).
45. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 50, 53, & 56.
47. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876), followed in New York Cent. R.R. v. White,
243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917); Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76 (1914); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912); Martin v. Pittsburg (sic) & L.E. R.R.,
203 U.S. 284, 294 (1906); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
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Statutory limitations on medical malpractice damages have survived
due process challenges in some courts. 48 General due process analysis requires consideration of "whether the new arrangement is arbitrary and
unreasonable,from the standpoint of naturaljustice.' '49 Unfortunately,
the concept of "arbitrary and unreasonable" is sufficiently nebulous to
allow subjective and arbitrary decisions regarding due process violations.
The United States Supreme Court has not definitively established a
quid pro quo requirement for legislative abrogation of common-law
rights.5 0 However, in upholding workers' compensation legislation 51 and
limitations on liability for nuclear power plant accidents, 52 the Court specifically noted in each case that the challenged legislation provided a quid
pro quo for the alteration of common-law remedies.
A quid pro quo requirement provides meaningful parameters for the
"arbitrary and unreasonable" concept; however, the -nalysis can be
skewed. For instance, in upholding limitations on medical malpractice recoveries two courts have accepted societal quid pro quo arguments.5 1 In
48. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, -, 695 P.2d 665, 682,
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 385 ($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages did not violate due process), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind.
374, __, 404 N.E.2d 585, 599 (1980) ($500,000 limit on total recovery, "not arbitrary and
irrational, but furthers the public purposes of the Act").
49. New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added).
50. See Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 786 (W.D. Va. 1986); see also State ex rel.
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, -, 261 N.W.2d 434, 447-48 (1978) (declining to adopt
quid pro quo test "fashioned" by other states).
51. Nor is it necessary, for the purposes of the present case, to say that a State might,
without violence to the constitutional guaranty of "due process of law," suddenly set
aside all common-law rules respecting liability as between employer and employee,
without providing a reasonably just substitute . . . it perhaps may be doubted
whether the State could abolish all rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses
on the other, without setting up something adequate in their stead. No such qustion
is here presented, and we intimate no opinion upon it.
New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added).
52. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978), the Court
left the quid pro quo question open after specifically finding that the statute's provisions
provided a reasonably just substitute for common-law remedies.
53. See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at - n.18, 695 P.2d at 681-82 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.18
("Even if due process principles required some 'quid pro quo' to support the statute, it
would be difficult to say that the preservation of a viable medical malpractice insurance
industry in this state was not an adequate benefit for the detriment the legislation imposes
on malpractice plaintiffs"); Johnson, 273 Ind. at -, 404 N.E.2d at 599 ("To the extent that
limitation upon recovery is successful in preserving the availability of health care services, it
does so to the benefit of the entire community including the badly injured plaintiff.").
However, in Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.
2d 313, -, 347 N.E.2d 736,
742 (1976), the court rejected the defendants' argument that the loss of potential recovery to
some malpractice victims is offset by the societal quid pro quo of "lower medical care costs
for all recipients of medical care." The court noted, "[t]his quid pro quo does not ... serve
to bring the limited recovery provisions within the rationale of the cases upholding the constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act." Id.
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contrast, quid pro quo findings by the United States Supreme Court have
rested on the extent to which the legislature substitutes personal benefits
for the statutory abrogation of the individual's common-law rights.5
Presumably, no legislature will enact legislation which clearly violates
societal interests. The quid pro quo analysis is more reasonably applied to
ensure that individual rights are not arbitrarily and unreasonably abrogated, even for the benefit of the majority. While societal benefits may be
a factor in considering the legitimacy of legislative goals, they cannot
serve as a quid pro quo justification for the abrogation of individual
rights. Perhaps in recognition of this logic, the quid pro quo analysis also
has been utilized by some courts reviewing equal protection and special
legislation challenges.5 5 The authorities suggest that, although not definitively required, a quid pro quo may provide a safe harbor against due
process challenges. In Baptist Hospital v. Baber,56 the court was reluctant
to adopt a quid pro quo requirement. However, the Baber court noted, "it
is safe to reflect, we think, that where a true quid pro quo does exist, it
57
strengthens the statutes' constitutionality.
The Act does not meet the quid pro quo standard. Under the Act, a
child's right to have a jury determine liability and damages is exchanged
for a no-fault provision. Furthermore, the damages disallowed by the Act
are substantial. In Boyd v. Bulala, evidence regarding noneconomic damages and future loss of earnings was introduced. The court sustained the
award of $1,000,000 in punitive damages and $1,850,000 in compensatory
damages to minor-plaintiff Veronica Boyd. In addition to this compensatory damage award, $1,700,000 was awarded to Mr. and Mrs. Boyd for
54.

If the employee is no longer able to recover as much as before in case of being injured through the employer's negligence, he is entitled to moderate compensation in
all cases of injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty and
expense of establishing negligence or proving the amount of damages .... On the
other hand, if the employer is left without defense respecting the question of fault, he
at the same time is assured that the recovery is limited, and that it goes directly to
the relief of the designated beneficiary.
New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 201.
The Price-Anderson Act's limitation of liability in the event of nuclear accidents was in
part justified as a mechanism to ensure recovery for individual plaintiffs. The Court noted
the probability that a defendant with theoretically unlimited liability would be unable to
pay judgments. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 89-90.
55. See, e.g., Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) ("Restrictions on recovery may encourage physicians to enter into practice and remain in practice, but do so only
at the expense of [plaintiffs] with meritorious claims."); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical
Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, -, 355 N.E.2d 903, 910 (Ct. C.P. 1976) ("[t]his court rejects
. . .the societal quid pro quo argument that some must give up their rights to damages so
that all can achieve cheaper medical care.").
56. 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), writ of error revoked, 714 S.W.2d 310
(Tex. 1986); see also Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 786 (the court refused to adopt a quid pro quo
requirement).
57. Baptist Hosp., 672 S.W.2d at 298.
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medical expenses until Veronica reached age eighteen. In sustaining the
compensatory damage award, Judge Michael noted that evidence regarding Veronica's severe and permanent physical and mental disabilities
"provided a sufficient foundation for the jury to conclude that Veronica's
capacity to appreciate and enjoy life had been permanently destroyed. 15 8
The Act denies affected children noneconomic and punitive damages such
as those awarded in Boyd,5 9 and allows only minimal compensation for
future loss of earnings.60
The Act provides compensation comparable to that of workers' compensation statutes which have withstood due process challenges.6 1 The
Act and worker's compensation statutes replace the common-law cause of
action for negligence with a statutory no-fault compensation scheme. In
both contexts, the elimination of fault is arguably a benefit that offsets
the abrogation of the common-law cause of action which could provide
much higher recovery. However, the historic purposes 2 and practical effect of no-fault provisions63 in worker's compensation laws are distinguishable from those of the Act. The quid pro quo rationale underlying
workers' compensation laws cannot justify the Act. The Act takes much
from and gives little to injured children. 4
58. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 793. The court concluded that under Virginia law, "the negligently inflicted and permanent destruction of an individual's capacity to appreciate and
enjoy life is a loss [or injury] for which compensatory damages are appropriate." Id. at 792
(citing Giant of Virginia, Inc. v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679, 685, 152 S.E.2d 271, 276 (1967)).
59. In 1987, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a $350,000 limit on punitive damages, applicable to all personal injury actions. Section 8.01-38.1 provides in pertinent part:
In any action accruing on or after July 1, 1988, including an action for malpractice
...the total amount awarded for punitive damages against all defendants found to
be liable shall be determined by the trier of fact. In no event shall the total amount
awarded for punitive damages exceed $350,000.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
60. Under the Act, a child who survives to the age of 18
[s]hall be conclusively presumed to have been able to earn income from work from
the age of eighteen through the age of sixty-five, if he had not been injured, in the
amount of fifty percent of the average weekly wage in the Commonwealth of workers
in the private, nonfarm sector.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(3) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
61. See cases cited supra at note 36.
62. See supra text accompany notes 37-40.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
64. It might be suggested that provisions requiring "participating" physicians and hospitals to render obstetrical services to indigent patients provides a sort of societal quid pro
quo. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Supp. 1987).
The better view seems to be that the quid pro quo must involve a direct benefit to the
injured patient whose rights are limited by the legislation. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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2. General Due Process Considerations
Even if a quid pro quo is not specifically required, the Act must withstand due process challenges that it is "arbitrary and unreasonable from
the standpoint of natural justice." 5 Statutory limitations on medical malpractice damages have survived due process challenges in several cases,6"
including Boyd v. Bulala.6 7 The Boyd court concluded that the right to

full recovery in tort is not a fundamental right under the federal or Virginia constitutions."' The court held that the cap was "a rational means
to achieve the legislative goal of securing the provision of health care services by maintaining the availability of malpractice insurance at affordable rates."6 9
The Act much more severely limits recovery than medical malpractice
caps. Under the Act, children with birth-related neurological injuries receive no compensation for devastating noneconomic losses. There is no
dispute that freedom from pain and suffering and the capacity to enjoy
and appreciate life are invaluable. However, some commentators advance
the bizarre argument that because these qualities are priceless, they
70
should also be noncompensable.

In Fein v. PermanenteMedical Group,71 the California Supreme Court
upheld a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages applicable to all medical
malpractice actions. However, in a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Bird
noted that "[i]n order to provide special relief to negligent health care
providers and their insurers, [California's malpractice statute] arbitrarily
singles out a few injured patients to be stripped of important
and well'7 2
established protections against negligently inflicted harm.

No other state has completely abrogated noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases and, in 1987, the Virginia General Assembly refused to adopt a limit on noneconomic damages which would have affected all tort victims. 7
65. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 202 (1917).
66. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, -, 695 P.2d 665, 682,
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 385 ($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages upheld: "[W]e know of no
principle of California-or federal-constitutional law which prohibits the Legislature from
limiting the recovery of damages in a particular setting."), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892
(1985); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, -,
404 N.E.2d 585, 598 (1980)
($500,000 limit on total recovery upheld as "proper exercise of the State's police power for
the promotion of the peace, safety, health or welfare of the public").
67. 647 F. Supp. 781, 787-88 (W.D. Va. 1986) ($750,000 cap on total recovery not violative of due process).
68. Id. at 787 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 476 (1959);
Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200 (1958); Zelermyer, Damagesfor
Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REv. 27 (1955).
71. 38 Cal. 3d 137, -, 695 P.2d 665, 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 385.
72. Id. at -, 695 P.2d at 687, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
73. See infra notes 88 & 90 and accompanying text.
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The avowed purpose of the Act is to ensure the availability of obstetrical services throughout the state. 4 Proponents assert that the Act was
essential to avert medical malpractice insurers' threats to stop covering
obstetricians.75 However, serving up the rights of catastrophically injured
infants to pacify medical malpractice insurers is not a reasonable means
of achieving any goal.
Due process and equal protection analyses are often inextricably intertwined. The equal protection analyses which follows supports the conclusion that the Act is "arbitrary and unreasonable from the standpoint of
17
natural justice. 6
C. Equal ProtectionAnalysis
1.

The Argument for Strict or Intermediate Scrutiny

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that
no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 7 In essence, this is a command "that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. 7'1 The Act denies children who
have sustained birth-related neurological injuries the common-law rights
and remedies which are available to all other medical malpractice victims,
including children who have sustained less severe birth-related injuries.
In United States v. Carolene Products Co.,79 an early equal protection
case, the United States Supreme Court noted: "[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." In San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriquez,80 the United States Supreme Court referred
to "traditional indicia of suspectness." The Court identified as suspect a
class "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarianpolitical process.""'
74. See supra note 3.
75. See supra note 2.
76. See New York Cent. R.R., 243 U.S. at 202.
77.

78.
Plyer
79.
80.
81.

U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV,

§

1.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
Id. (emphasis added).
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The Act discriminates against the small class of children " who will sustain catastrophic birth-related neurological injuries each year in Virginia.
The affected children will suffer immutable8 3 physical and mental disabilities as a resilt of brain or spinal cord injuries; they will be "permanently
nonambulatory, aphasic,4 incontinent, and in need of assistance in all
phases of daily living."'

The political powerlessness of the children is best illustrated by the
fate of comparable legislative proposals which would have affected all tort
victims. 8 5 A legislative report regarding "The Liability Insurance Crisis" 8

included numerous tort reform proposals. The joint subcommittee"1 recommended, inter alia, legislation to limit noneconomic damages in all
tort cases 8 and legislation to mandate periodic, rather than lump sum,
payments of awards for future damages in excess of $250,000.8 Neither of
these proposals was as harsh as the Act's provisions which completely
82. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
83. The existence of immutable physical characteristics which distinguish certain classes
has triggered heightened judicial scrutiny in equal protection challenges. See, e.g., Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (invalidating statute which discriminated on the basis of sex, "an immutable characteristic").
However, the significance of immutable personal characteristics in identifying suspect
classifications has been challenged.
[C]lassifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically accepted as
legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that immutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is that those characteristics (unlike the one
the commentator is trying to render suspect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point, there's not much left of the immutability theory, is there?
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Supp. 1987).
85. One commentator has noted that malpractice victims are not protected from unfair
reform by normal political processes.
[I]t seems highly unlikely that many individuals actively contemplate the relatively
remote risk that they may become malpractice victims. The number of actual victims
is not large enough to generate widespread public concern for personal safety, nor is
notice of the restrictive legislation sufficiently prominent to draw the attention of
individuals who may rationally assume that they continue to possess an effective judicial remedy.
Learner, Restrictive Medical MalpracticeCompensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid
Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143, 186 (1981)
(citations omitted).
When the Act was passed the affected children were unborn. In addition, most people do
not consider the possibility of having a catastrophically injured child. Therefore, no one was
in a position to take a personal stand against the Act when it was proposed.

86. THE

LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM,

supra note 2.

87. The official title of the joint subcommittee was the "Joint Subcommittee Studying
the Liability Insurance Crisis and the Need for Tort Reform."

88.

THE LIABILITY INSURANCE

CRIsis, supra note 2, at 5; see S.B. 402, Va. Gen. Assem-

bly, 1987 Sess.

89.

THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS

1987 Sess.

supra note 2, at 5; see S.B. 411, Va. Gen. Assembly,
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eliminate noneconomic damages and limit recovery to reimbursement for
actually incurred expenses. However, neither measure was enacted.90
In addition to the Act, which was not recommended by the joint subcommittee, several other measures were passed which limit obstetricians'
liability. The joint subcommittee's specific proposals to alleviate the "obstetrical malpractice crisis" were enacted. In accordance with the joint
subcommittee's recommendations, the statute of limitations for medical
malpractice actions no longer is tolled until injured children reach the age
of majority.91
Under the amendment, minor children have two years to file a claim
unless they were less than eight years old at the time of the occurrence.
In that case, they have until their tenth birthday to file suit. A "good
samaritan" provision also was enacted to grant immunity from civil liability for malpractice when free obstetrical services are rendered.92
90. Senate Bill 411, which required periodic payment for judgments of future damages in
excess of $250,000, apparently died after referral to the Committee for Courts of Justice.
See 1 SENATE J., 11 (1987); 2 SENATE J. 43 app. (1987).
Senate Bill 402, which proposed a limitation of noneconomic damages of $250,000 or three
times the amount of economic damages, was also referred to the Committee for Courts of
Justice. See SENATE J., 10, (1987).
Senate Bill 402 was the subject of vigorous debate during a public hearing before the
Committee for Courts of Justice. Three hundred people attended the hearing and clearly
expressed their opposition to the limitation on noneconomic damages. See Richmond News
Leader, Jan. 23, 1987, at 4, col. 1. Representatives of the Virginia AFL-CIO, the Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, the United Methodist Church, and the Virginia Poverty Law
Center protested the proposed limitation on damages for "pain and suffering." Id. at 4, col.
2. Attorney General Mary Sue Terry also appeared to assert her position that Virginia citizens should not be penalized for high insurance losses in other states. Id. at 4, col. 5.
Senate Bill 402 was radically amended in the House of Delegates and subsequently enacted as a $350,000 limit on punitive damages. See 1 SENATE J., 801-02; see also supra note
59.
91. [A]ny cause of action accruing on or after July 1, 1987, on behalf of a person who
was a minor at the time the cause of action accrued for personal injury or death
against a health care provider. . . shall be commenced within two years of the date
of the last act or omission giving rise to the cause of action except that if the minor
was less than eight years of age at the time of the occurrence of the malpractice, he
shall have until his tenth birthday to commence an action.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243.1 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
The shorter statute of limitations was recommended "in order to provide more predictability to the loss assessment process, reduce the risk of providing coverage for these losses
and thereby, make the necessary liability insurance coverage more widely available at a rea-

sonable cost"

THE LIABILITY INSURANc E CRISIS,

supra note 2, at 5.

92. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.
According to testimony heard by the joint subcommittee, in order to reduce liability exposure, many physicians and hospitals throughout Virginia were refusing to participate in the
delivery of indigent women, who are considered high-risk patients because of poor prenatal

care.

THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS,

supra note 2, at 14.

Whether by design or coincidence, it appears that the good samaritan provision and the
Act obviate Medicaid budget problems. In order to obtain matching federal funds, the State
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The limitation on punitive damages in all personal injury actions,
which was enacted in 1987, will also decrease liability for obstetrical malpractice."' By previous legislation, the General Assembly had authorized a
joint underwriting association to alleviate availability problems.0 4 However, the joint subcommittee questioned the efficacy of Virginia's Joint
Underwriting Association which was activated on December 3, 1986.21
These measures combined are sufficient to alleviate the "obstetrical malpractice crisis" without usurping the due process and equal protection
rights of injured children.
The Act denies affected children the recourse that every other medical
malpractice victim has to recover in tort from the physicians or hospitals
which have caused disabilities. Arguably, the Act creates a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification which should be reviewed with strict or intermediate scrutiny.0 6 However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized only race, national origin, alienage, gender, and illegitimacy as suspect or quasi-suspect classifications.9
Medicaid Program must reimburse participating providers at rates sufficient to ensure availability of the covered services to recipients. A survey of Northern Virginia physicians revealed that less than half would accept Medicaid patients because the $350 Medicaid reimbursement rate is "far short" of the $1,232 fee which would be reasonable. Wash. Post, Feb.
17, 1987, at B5, col. 5.
The Act requires that "participating" physicians and hospitals provide obstetrical care to
indigent patients. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Supp. 1987). In conjunction with the good
samaritan provision, the Act ensures that Medicaid access requirements can be met without
budget increases.
93. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1987).
94. See Id. § 38.2-2800 to -2814 (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Supp. 1987).

95.

THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS,

supra note 2, at 13.

96. Statutory provisions which create distinctions based on suspect classifications invoke
strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny analysis, the statute must further a compelling state
interest. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Statutes rarely survive strict scrutiny. The
test has been characterized as "strict in theory and fatal in fact." See Gunther, Foreward:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
Quasi-suspect classifications such as gender and illegitimacy are subjected to intermediate
scrutiny. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-based discrimination). Intermediate scrutiny requires a showing
that the classification is reasonable and supported by "some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 7576 (1977) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
Intermediate or means-focused scrutiny has been the basis for some state court decisions
that medical malpractice caps violate equal protection. See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page
Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (the court did not specifically label its
scrutiny intermediate; however, it apparently applied intermediate scrutiny); see also Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (statute violated state constitution's equal
protection guarantee).
97. Trimble, 430 U.S. 762 (illegitimacy); Craig,429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin).
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2. Rational Basis Analysis
a. The Mere Rationality Standard
Several courts have held that statutory limitations on medical malpractice damages violate equal protection.9" However, in accordance with
other authorities,99 the court in Boyd v. Bulala'00 held that Virginia's limitation on damages did not violate equal protection. The statutory cap
survived the most deferential rational basis analysis. 10' The Boyd court
concluded that Virginia's cap on damages in all medical malpractice actions neither created a suspect classification nor infringed upon a fundamental right. 0 2 Despite the similar purposes of the statute in Boyd and
98. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, -, 424 A.2d 825, 836-37 (1980) ($250,000
cap on noneconomic damages distinguishes between medical malpractice victims with
noneconomic losses that exceed $250,000 and those with less egregious losses, as well as
between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d
125, 136 (N.D. 1978) ($300,000 limitation on medical malpractice recovery violative of equal
protection in the absence of finding of state availability or cost crisis); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, -, 355 N.E.2d 903, 911-12 (Ct. C.P. 1976) ("there
is no crisis situation, short of civil insurrection, sufficient to deprive, water down or make
less valuable the right to seek redress of grievances, to a dollar amount fully compensating
one for his loss, though [sic] the medium of a free and unfettered jury trial"); see also
Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 III. 2d 313, -,
347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1976) ("to
the extent that recovery is permitted or denied on an arbitrary basis a special privilege is
granted in violation of the Illinois Constitution"); Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296,
298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) ($500,000 limitation on hospitals' malpractice liability unconstitutional as violation of equal protection), writ of errorrevoked, 714 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1986).
99. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, -,
695 P.2d 665, 683, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 386 ($250,000 limit on recovery of noneconomic losses in medical malpractice
cases not violative of equal protection), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Johnson v.
St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, -,
404 N.E.2d 585, 601 (1980) ($500,000 limit on
recovery valid; "rational justification for the difference in treatment accorded the various
groups identified within the rationality of the program launched by the Legislature to protect vital societal interests"); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, -, 256 N.W.2d 657, 669
(1977) (plurality opinion) ($500,000 limit on total recovery valid; court "will not set aside a
statutory discrimination if any state of facts exists to justify it").
100. 647 F. Supp. 781, 788 (W.D. Va. 1986).
101. Rational basis analysis often results in an automatic validation of legislation. "[A]
statute will be sustained if the legislature could have reasonably concluded that the challenged classification would promote a legitimate state purpose." Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,
462 U.S. 176, 196 (1983). The actual efficacy of the legislation is not questioned in mere
rational basis analysis. The courts will defer to legislative judgment so long as the legislature
"could rationallyhave decided" that the statute would further a legitimate purpose. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981).
102. 647 F. Supp. at 787. However, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972), the United States Supreme Court held that a Louisiana statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover workers' compensation benefits for the death of their
natural father violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Weber majority identified two essential questions in equal protection challenges: "What legitimate state interest does the classificationpromote? What fundamental personal rights
might the classificationendanger?" Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
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the Act, the Act should not be reviewed under "the liberal standard of
review normally accorded economic regulations under equal protection
.. . analys[i]s."' 0' Since the children affected by the Act meet the traditional definition of a suspect class, they should be protected by a more
exacting standard of review than mere rational basis analysis.
b. The Argument for Heightened Rational Basis Analysis
In City of Cleburne v. City of Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,104 the
United States Supreme Court refused to recognize "the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded" as quasi-suspect. The Court's reluctance to treat the class as quasi-suspect was tempered by its reaffirmation
of the equal protection requirement that "legislation that distinguishes
between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose."' 0 5 In fact, the Court's assurance that the
mentally retarded would not be left "entirely unprotected from invidious
discrimination"'' 0 was substantiated by the holding that the statute in
question, as applied, was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection. Concurring, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, criticized the majority's analysis in City of Cleburne and refused to
"accept the Court's disclaimer that no 'more exacting standard' than ordinary rational-basis review [was] being applied.'

07

In his concurring

opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, rejected the notion that equal protection decisions are reached by applying varying
levels of scrutiny. 08
Illegitimacy has been recognized as a quasi-suspect classification which requires heightened scrutiny. See supra notes 96-97. However, the Weber Court's analysis suggests that
discrimination against illegitimate children was not the only basis for heightened scrutiny.
The equal protection standard formulated in Weber implies that the Court considered the
children's right to recovery a "fundamental personal right." See Weber, 406 U.S. at 182-83
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 787. The prohibition against discrimination contained in article I, section 11 of the Virginia Constitution is applicable only to classifications based on
religion, race, color, sex, or national origin. See id. at 786 (citing Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va.
633, 638, 194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (1973)).
The Boyd court concluded that article IV, section 14 of the Virginia Constitution which
prohibits special legislation does not provide greater protection than the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. (citing Bray v.
County Bd. of Arlington County, 195 Va. 31, 35, 77 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1953)).
The court found that the medical malpractice cap was "clearly a rational means to
achieve the legislative goal of securing the provision of health services by maintaining the
availability of malpractice insurance at affordable rates." Id. at 787.
104. 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985).
105. Id. at 446.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Id. at 451-52 (Stevens, J., concurring). According to Justice Stevens,
[Rationality] includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically be-
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There are salient distinctions between the mentally retarded class in
City of Cleburne and the children affected by the Act. Primarily, mental
retardation is not one of the disabilities enumerated in the Act. The children may or may not suffer from mental retardation in addition to the
profound mental and physical disabilities specifically enumerated in the
Act. 109 In addition, in contrast to "the large and amorphous class of the
mentally retarded,"' 1 0 the Act applies to a carefully defined minority of
infants whose catastrophic injuries pose the greatest liability risks in the
obstetrical field.
Regardless of whether the children are labeled as a suspect or quasisuspect class, the Act should at least be reviewed with heightened scrutiny, such as that applied in City of Cleburne. "The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury.""' Justice demands
that these children not be arbitrarily denied the right to the actions and
remedies available to every other medical malpractice victim. Proponents
of the Act may argue it was necessary to remove injured children from
the tort system
in order to ensure the availability of obstetrical services in
2
Virginia."
The availability of medical malpractice coverage is unquestionably related to physicians' willingness to render medical services. However, the
availability of insurance does not guarantee that a physician will not be
exposed to substantial personal liability for negligently inflicted injuries.
For instance, the Boyd jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages
totalling $8,300,000. By statute, Virginia physicians may contract for insurance coverage of punitive damages." 3 However, it would be rare for a
physician to request or obtain sufficient coverage for the amount of damlieve that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends
the harm to members of the disadvantaged class. Thus, the word "rational".. . includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially.
Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
109. Although the Act purports to apply to brain or spinal cord injuries, the inclusion of
aphasia necessarily implies that all of the affected children have sustained brain damage.
See VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Supp. 1987). Aphasia is defined as "impaired or absent
communication by speech, writing, or signs, due to dysfunction of brain centers in the dominant hemisphere." STEDMAN'S MEDIcAL DICTIONARY 96 (5th unabr. lawyers ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
The presence of brain damage does not necessarily mean that any or all of the affected
children will be mentally retarded. However, it may be reasonable to assume that many of
the children who suffer injuries of the nature and severity defined in the Act will also be
mentally retarded.
110. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445.
111. Marbury v. Madison, 1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
112. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-227 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
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ages awarded in Boyd.114 In the absence of a bad faith refusal to settle for
the policy limits, medical malpractice insurance carriers are not liable for
awards in excess of the policy limits."1
Malpractice insurance carriers can control their risks by limiting policy
coverage and negotiating settlements in good faith. By contrast, physicians face limitless exposure in cases involving extraordinary damage
awards. In response to this exposure, the Act was drafted in accordance
with the specifications of the Virginia Insurance Reciprocal, a state-based
physicians' group. 16 It is physicians, then, particularly those who render
substandard care, who primarily benefit from the Act.
The Act will undoubtedly make obstetrical care more attractive to physicians. In fact, by conferring a special immunity from tort liability for
the most serious obstetrical injuries, the Act may cause an increase in the
number of physicians who practice obstetrics. The Act's apparent goal is
to ensure the availability of obstetrical care, 1 7 but the goal must be to
ensure the availability of competent obstetricians. Insulating negligent
obstetricians from tort liability is not rationally related to the legitimate
goal of ensuring the availability of competent obstetricians.
IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The tort system has two generally recognized goals-compensation,
which is intended "to make the plaintiff whole," ' 8 and deterrence. The
Act denies compensation for noneconomic losses and provides only limited compensation for economic losses. 19 The Act also thwarts the tort
system's deterrence goal. 2 '
114. In 1983, only 41% of all doctors carried malpractice coverage of $1,000,000 or more.
Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice:Thoughts about
the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 954-55 n.77 (1984) (citing
Holoweiko, Malpractice Premiums: Hefty Today, Huge Tomorrow, MED. ECON., Nov. 28,
1983, at 87, 96)).
After Boyd, Dr. Ronald K. Davis, a leader in the Medical Society of Virginia, commented:
"Nobody knows how much insurance we need .... We can't get $5 million; the insurance
companies won't write it." See Debate on MalpracticeAward Cap is Revived, supra note 4,
at A2, col. 4.
115. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Price, 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220 (1966); see also
Comment, Insurers'Liability for Excess Judgments in Virginia: Negligence or Bad Faith?,
15 U. RIcH. L. REV. 153 (1980).
116. See supra note 2.
117. See supra note 3.
118. Klaven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158,
160 (1958).
119. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
120. It is not possible to obtain punitive damages under the Act. However, if a claimant
can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that a health care provider willfully caused or
intended to cause a birth-related meurological injury, a traditional common-law medical
malpractice action can be filed. See supra note 16.
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There is much debate about the correlation between actual occurrences
of professional negligence and the increasing number of malpractice
claims filed."2 ' However, there is evidence that the frequency of medical
malpractice warrants concern. A widely-cited California study indicates
that approximately one percent of hospital admissions results in injuries
due to negligence. "Most physicians may well act in their patient's best
interests most of the time, even without the threat of liability, neverthe1 22
less the incidence of medical negligence is too common to be ignored."
Under the Act, awards for covered injuries are made by the Virginia
Industrial Commission,1 23 and paid from the Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Fund, 2 " without regard to fault. Participating physicians and hospitals pay uniform, annual assessments to the Fund. 2 5
Negligence affects neither the provider's liability for any given claim, nor
his assessment rate. 26 In fact, there is no guarantee that any 2definitive
7
determination regarding a provider's fault will be made at all.1
In 1987, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a $350,000 limit on punitive damages,
applicable to all tort actions. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1987).
121. Physicians argue that statistically "the doctor most likely to be sued is a middleaged physician at the height of his or her career" who necessarily attempts innovative, high
risk procedures on gravely ill patients. Browning, Doctors and Lawyers Face Off, ABA J.,
July 1, 1986, at 38, 41.
By contrast, lawyers point to statistics which "show that most malpractice actions arise
from a series of multiple mistakes made by a small percentage of doctors." Id. at 40. For
example, reportedly 10 Wisconsin physicians accounted for $8,000,000 of the medical malpractice judgments in the state during a 10 year period. Id. at 41.
122. P. DANZON, supra note 38, at 221-22. Even on a purely economic level, quality control is essential. Danzon estimates that negligent injury costs are several times higher than
malpractice insurance premium costs. Id. at 222.
123. See supra note 20.
124. VA.CODE ANN. § 38.2-5015 (Supp. 1987).
125. Id. §§ 38.2-5019 to -5020.
126. The Act can be analogized to partial no-fault systems which have been proposed by
some commentators. See supra note 43. Under such no-fault systems, if premiums are not
experience-rated, the incentive for injury avoidance is reduced. P. DANZON, supra note 38, at
218. However, when premiums are experience-rated, physicians may avoid high-risk patients
and high-risk procedures, or charge higher fees to cover the higher liability risk. Id.
127. The Act requires that a copy of the claimant's petition regarding claims against a
participating physician or hospital be provided for the Board of Medicine and Department
of Health. These agencies are directed to evaluate the quality of care and impose sanctions
if appropriate. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5004(2) (Supp. 1987).
Statistics regarding the number of cases heard by the Virginia Board of Medicine during
1987 were obtained. Computerized information is available for cases heard by the Board
since July 1986. However, no records are kept on the number of "complaints" which result
in no action. Preliminary investigations of "serious" complaints take from six months to one
year.
In 1987, the Board of Medicine heard 378 cases. No violations were found in 232 cases;
violations were found in 106 cases, and 40 cases were "undetermined." Of the complaints
significant enough to be heard by the Board, only 28% resulted in findings of violations.
A sample of 88 violations acted on by the Board in 1987 revealed only eight cases involv-
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The drafters may have intended to replace the deterrent effect of the
tort system by providing for claim reviews by the Board of Medicine and
Department of Health." 8 However, physicians, 2 9 as well as lawyers, 130
recognize the ineffectiveness of disciplinary mechanisms within the medical profession. Neither the economic' 31 nor moral deterrents 32 associated
with tort liability are replaced by the Act. Virginia already has an exceptionally high infant mortality rate.13 The possibility of increased obstetrical malpractice undercuts the purported societal benefits of the Act.
The 1987 legislative study regarding "The Insurance Liability Crisis"
ing "standard of care" violations. The following sanctions were imposed: reprimand or warning (2); probation (4); revocation of license (1); and voluntary surrender of license (1). Additionally, two cases were classified as "inability to practice"; the sanctions were probation in
one case and refusal to renew the physician's license in the other.
Approximately 41% of the 88 sample violation cases from 1987 involved personal drug
use, excessive prescribing, indiscriminate dispensing, incomplete drug records, or the catchall category "drug related." The second largest group of violations was unprofessional conduct (23%). An additional 21 cases involved unlicensed practice, fraud, criminal conviction,
sexual abuse, and inappropriate advertising.
128. It may be asserted that the risk of sanctions, including revocation of professional
licenses, will serve as an adequate deterrent for malpractice. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.25004(2) (Supp. 1987).
129. President-elect of the American Medical Society, Dr. William S. Hotchkiss, a surgeon from Chesapeake, Virginia, acknowledged the difficulties doctors have policing their
own ranks. He also criticized current procedures for removing imcompetent physicians from
practice.
Dr. Hotchkiss recommended legislation to provide increased authority and immunity for
disciplinary board members and noted that state boards are "terribly handicapped" by the
threat of litigation. Dr. Hotchkiss also advocated using medical licensing fees to fund proper
investigations. See Richmond News Leader, Aug. 7, 1986, at A8, col. 2.
130. Of the 450,000 licensed physicians in the United States, only 1,400 were disciplined
by state medical licensing boards in 1984. See Browning, supra note 122, at 39. The Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States reports that actually, 1,687 disciplinary
actions were taken in 1984. Accurate statistics were not available for preceding years. Id. at
41.
Various quality control systems, including medical licensure and hospital accreditation,
state boards of quality assurance, and hospital oversight committees, could serve as alternatives to the tort system's deterrent function. However, "these systems provide only gross
filters, designed to eliminate the seriously incompetent physician. . . and to the extent that
they rely on peer review, they lack strong incentives to take disciplinary action." See P.
DANZON, supra note 38, at 222.
131. See generally, Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15
GA. L. REv. 851 (1981).

132. One commentator concludes that the essential deterrent value of the tort liability
system with respect to malpractice is psychological. Bell concludes that the real deterrent is
"the declaration of wrongfulness and the social stigma that goes with that." See Bell, supra
note 115, at 992. The no-fault compensation system prescribed by the Act precludes public
adjudication of fault. See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text.
133. See Richmond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 5, 1988, at B6, col. 1. Virginia's infant mortality rate is higher than that of 21 other states. The Statewide Council on Infant Mortality
urges that Virginia must reduce its high infant mortality rate, which rivals that of Third
World countries. Id. at B6, col. 1.
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revealed that "Virginia occupies a preferred position among other states
with respect to loss experience. In the medical malpractice area, Virginia
has the third best loss ratio in the country."' 34 Virginia's Attorney General, Mary Sue Terry, has expressed concern that Virginia citizens are
5
subsidizing insureds in other states with bad loss experiences. 1" The joint
subcommittee's report also noted that loss claims in insurance company
reports can be exaggerated. 3 ' The General Assembly's abrogation of the
rights of children who sustain birth-related neurological injuries therefore
creates a dangerous precedent. Insurance companies may fabricate new
crises in the future and look to Virginia for additional subsidies.
V.

CONCLUSION

John Ely has observed, "[c]onstitutional law appropriately exists for
those situations where representative government cannot be trusted, not
those where we know it can.' ' 137 The rights of the tiny minority of infants
who will sustain birth-related neurological injuries, as defined by the Act,
have been eviscerated by the machinery of majoritarian politics. The constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection must be invoked to protect these children.
Although the Supreme Court has not definitively established a quid pro
quo requirement, it is submitted that where a legislature totally abrogates
a common-law cause of action, the statute's validity should rest upon a
quid pro quo finding. Contrary to workers' compensation statutes which
have withstood due process challenges, the Act cannot meet the quid pro
quo requirement. The differences between the historic purposes and practical effect of the workers' compensation laws and those of the Act belie
the argument that the quid pro quo justification for workers' compensation can support the Act.
The children affected by the Act satisfy traditional indicia of a suspect
classification. The children's political powerlessness and disabilities are
evident. Since the Act denies an important right to children who arguably
constitute a suspect class, heightened scrutiny should be invoked to protect the children from the arbitrary and unreasonable actions of a
majoritarian legislature. Moreover, the Act violates equal protection because it insulates negligent physicians, and their insurers, from tort liability at the expense of catastrophically injured children. Therefore, the Act
is not rationally related to the legitimate goal of ensuring the availability
of competent obstetricians.
134. See THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRIsIs, supra note 2, at 11.
135. Id; see also supra note 90.
136. Critics of the insurance industry contend that the companies can easily manipulate.
their records. According to the National Consumer Organization, insurance profit, after tax,
for 1985 was five billion dollars. See THE LIABLITY INSURANCE CRISIS, supra note 2, at 8.at 8.
137. See J. ELY, supra note 83, at 183.
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Finally, the Act threatens the welfare of other Virginia citizens. The
possibility of increased obstetrical malpractice, resulting from tort immunity, is a risk the Commonwealth cannot afford. Moreover, the legislature's willingness to sacrifice these childrens' rights increases the
probability that similar sacrifices will be expected of other groups when
new "liability crises" arise.
Jane R. Ward

